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Abstract
I analyze an economy with uncertainty in which a set of indivisible objects and
a certain amount of money is to be distributed among agents. The set of intertem-
porally fair social choice functions based on envy-freeness and Pareto eﬃciency is
characterized. I give a necessary and suﬃcient condition for its non-emptiness and
propose a mechanism that implements the set of intertemporally fair allocations in
Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Implementation at the ex ante stage is considered, too.
I also generalize the existence result obtained with envy-freeness using a broader
fairness concept, introducing the aspiration function.
Keywords: aspiration function, envy-free social choice function, fairness, imple-
mentation, indivisible goods, uncertainty
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1 Introduction
Envy-free allocations are allocations for which every agent prefers his own bundle to the
ones assigned to other agents. In the economies I deal with, a set of indivisible objects
is to be distributed among a group of agents such that individuals consume at most one
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object. In general envy-free allocations might not exist, but when a proper amount of a
perfectly-divisible good, typically money, is available in the economy, the set of envy-free
allocations is not empty and indeed can be quite large. Alkan, Demange and Gale (1991)
and Aragone´s (1995) study these economies, the existence of envy-free allocations and
how the amount of the divisible good aﬀects the existence results. It is shown that for
a suﬃciently large amount of money the set of envy-free allocations is not empty. When
negative distribution of money is not allowed there exists a minimum level of money that
guarantees non-emptiness and implies a unique way to combine objects and money such
that these bundles give rise to an envy-free allocation. Based on this result refinements
can be defined that reduce the size of the set down to a singleton. It is the case of the
so-called Rawlsian solutions proposed by Alkan, Demange and Gale (1991) and the one
in Aragone´s (1995) that in fact coincide. It is well known that in this environment envy-
freeness implies Pareto eﬃciency and therefore envy-free allocations can be considered as
fair ones, too. Also, some nice features of the envy-free set are proper to the indivisible
case, as for example its lattice structure.
There are many situations in which this type of models can be useful. Nevertheless
there are numerous cases that can not be handled due to the presence of uncertainty.
The present work deals with the study of the latter. I study economies with any number
of objects and individuals participating in the distribution as long as there are at least
as many agents as objects. I review the above mentioned results taking into account
economies in which information is not complete in some timing stages. A distinction is
made among ex ante, interim and ex post stages; and according to that diﬀerent envy-
free, eﬃciency and fairness notions are defined. The intersection between the sets of ex
ante Pareto optimal and ex post envy-free is particularly interesting and will be called
ex ante intertemporally fair. Moulin (1997) pointed out that fairness from an ex ante
point of view can be seen as a concept of procedural justice. It is a characteristic of the
mechanism or game form itself and is independent of the way the game is played by the
agents in the future. Ex post fairness can be interpreted as endstate justice that deals
with a particular utility or judgement profile and a particular endstate in a given state of
the nature. I take into account both judgement concepts, since my model considers the
most restrictive definition for fairness that allows both for ex ante and ex post justice.
I keep the assumption that individuals can consume at most one indivisible object in
a given state, but do not constrain the amount of money that can appear in consumption
bundles. The former is clearly a restriction, nevertheless my model can account for numer-
ous real-life problems and is accepted as a common assumption in the discrete literature.
Two of the classical real-life situations covered by my framework appear in the following
examples.
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Example 1 A group of students decides to share a flat. There are as many rooms in the
flat as students and it is agreed upon that everyone will have a private room and noone
leaves or enters the group later. Rooms are of diﬀerent characteristics (size, quietness,
etc.) and the students have their own private valuations over them. These valuations
might be unknown at the time they enter in the flat as they might have never lived in a
similar situation before. The problem to be solved - before (ex ante), immediately after
(interim) or after (ex post) entering the flat - is to assign a room to every students and
decide the share of the rent each of them must pay in a fair way.
Example 2 A number of villages has to participate in a flood-protection project. There
is a certain number of tasks to be executed and some amount of money available for the
realization. Tasks are of diﬀerent characteristics and the villages are supposed to have
their own valuations over them. For example, some tasks might be or might look easier
to carry out for a village than for the others, etc. Nevertheless, these villages might have
never participated in a similar cooperation and therefore could have some uncertainty when
evaluating future possibilities, e.g. for example the ones of success or failure in their tasks.
The problem to be solved by the central authority is to assign a task to every village and
with it a share of the fixed budget in a possibly fair way.
As is well known, competitive equilibrium theory runs into diﬃculties when consid-
ering indivisibilities. However, there exists a special case that has been studied in the
literature that is tractable. Here that framework with several indivisible objects and a
perfectly divisible one (usually thought of as money) is adopted. I prove that ex ante in-
tertemporally fair social choice functions exist whenever certain condition on prior beliefs
and preferences holds. Beside of the constructive nature of the proof, the importance of
that condition is shown in two simple numeric examples and through identifying an intu-
itive special case of the condition: If agents have the same prior beliefs and preferences
show constant marginal utility of money among agents for a given state, then the set of ex
ante intertemporally fair state-contingent allocations is not empty. Some fairness results
under uncertainty without indivisibilities are discussed in Gajdos and Tallon (2001). They
prove existence in the adopted perfectly divisible framework. I obtain similar results to
those in Gajdos and Tallon (2001) according to which the existence of intertemporally fair
allocations depends on agents’ prior beliefs, for a given state they must be the same for
every agent. In contrast to Gajdos and Tallon (2001), here utilities are state dependent,
and the necessary and suﬃcient condition for existence is slightly less restrictive.
After considering the problem of existence I proceed to implementation matters. The
literature under certainty oﬀers the characterization of fair allocations, and gives methods
to find them once the social planner (or some central government) learns the individuals’
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preferences. A constructive and very elegant way to find them is presented in Su (1999)
that is based on a simple combinatorial lemma due to Sperner in 1928. The leading ex-
ample in Su (1999) is flat sharing as in Example 1. This paper studies the case in which
agents behave strategically, the social planner is not informed about the preferences, and
players are not completely informed either. Relying on results in Palfrey and Srivastava
(1987), for Bayesian implementability the condition of non-exclusive information is in-
troduced and a mechanism that implements the set of non-wasteful ex post envy-free
social choice functions in Bayes-Nash equilibrium is defined. A subsection deals with the
problem of implementation at the ex ante stage in which information is symmetric. Due
to this fact I conclude that simple mechanisms of the ”divide-and-permute” or ”cake-
cutting” type can be used to implement the set of ex ante intertemporally social choice
functions. This result is presented beside of the ones in McAfee (1992) according to which
the cake-cutting mechanism produces eﬃcient results under symmetric information, but
under asymmetric information it is ex post ineﬃcient in an unusual way.
The fair-division literature has already examined the above implementation problem
under certainty with indivisibilities and two players. Crawford and Heller (1979), for
example, showed that a modified version of the divide-and-choose mechanism performs
well in the adopted set-up.
The present paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the formal model and
defines the basic concepts of fairness that are studied, while Section 3 deals with the
question of existence. A subsection presents a generalization of the Rawlsian refinement
proposed by Alkan, Demange and Gale (1991) and Aragone´s (1995). On Section 4 I
discuss implementation matters.
Considering the first chapters of this work, it is a self-contained study based on the
axiomatically accepted notion of intertemporal fairness that embodies envy-freeness. The
literature on distributive justice usually follows a similar path and does not deal with the
problematic of choosing fairness criteria. However, an extra section (Section 5) is included
that considers the aspiration function as an appropriate tool for studying fairness without
restricting attention on a particular concept. Corcho´n and Iturbe-Ormaetxe (2001) oﬀers
a detailed study of fairness in a generalized set-up. Section 5 here can be seen as the
adaptation of some very few definitions from Corcho´n and Iturbe-Ormaetxe (2001) to the
uncertainty case with indivisibilities. The most important point in that part of the paper
is the generalization of the existence result. I find that under the conditions stated for the
envy-free case, and under some restrictions on personal aspirations, an intertemporally
fair social choice function exists. Intertemporally fair is now a broader concept that allows
among others for envy-free and for the egalitarian solutions. The condition is suﬃcient
and necessary here, too. At the end of the paper I study the problem of implementation
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of the set of the generalized intertemporally fair social choice functions. I conclude with
a positive result: a condition (on the fairness concept) that is necessary for Bayesian
monotonicity, i.e. for Bayesian implementation is derived.
2 The model
Let N be a finite set of agents, O a finite set of indivisible objects and S a finite set of
possible states of nature. The typical elements of the sets are i, o and s respectively. For
simplicity I shall denote the cardinality of the sets by the same symbols N , O and S.
There is also a perfectly divisible good in the economy called money, the total available
amount of which is M ∈ R. Each agent can consume at most one indivisible object and
any amount of money.
For simplicity and presentational considerations assume that the set of agents and the
set of objects have the same cardinality. This is a standard assumption in the literature. If
there are at least as many agents as objects one can achieve this situation by introducing
worthless null objects. Hence, the analysis holds for any economy with more agents than
objects, too. The reverse case in which there are more objects than agents is tractable, too.
Alkan, Demange and Gale (1991) present an argument in a set-up without uncertainty. It
requires fictitious agents that only value money, and also diﬀerent definitions for eﬃciency,
envy-freeness, etc. To keep things simple this case is not considered here.
In the economy there is uncertainty concerning the state of the nature. As for timing, I
distinguish three stages: In the ex ante stage information is symmetric, but agents have to
cope with uncertainty as they do not know which state of nature will occur. The interim
stage is the one in which a given state of nature has already occurred, but agents cannot
observe it perfectly and may own private information. This informational asymmetry is
dissolved at the next, ex post stage when agents are completely informed about the state.
There is no aggregate risk in my model, as the list of objects and the amount of money
if fixed across all states of the world.
In general, information available to agent i is given by a partition Πi of the set S,
where the event in partition Πi that contains the state s is denoted by Ei (s). From an
ex ante point of view a prior probability distribution can be defined over states, that for
agent i and state s will be denoted by qi (s) > 0. I shall assume that the set S does not
contain any redundant elements, that is ∩iEi (s) = {s} for all s ∈ S.
Allocations in this economy will be represented by vectors in A = (O × R)N . Let
Ai = O×R denote player i’s set of allocation. Now the set of allocations can be expressed
as a Cartesian product A = A1 × . . .×AN . For example, an allocation is given by
a =
¡
a1, ..., aN
¢
=
£¡
o1,m1
¢
, ...,
¡
oN ,mN
¢¤
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where ai stands for the bundle that agent i consumes in which she receives object oi that
may be as well the empty set. The amount of money that agent i enjoys in the given
allocation is mi. The set of feasible allocations is defined as
Af =
(
a ∈ A : oi 6= oj for any i 6= j with oi 6= ∅, oj 6= ∅, and
NX
i=1
mi ≤M
)
.
An allocation will be called non-wasteful if every agent has an object and the money
shares sum up to M . Formally,
Afnw =
(
a ∈ Af :
N
∪
i=1
©
oi
ª
= O, and
NX
i=1
mi =M
)
.
Non-wasteful allocations are those feasible ones in which every object finds an owner
and the money shares sum up to the total available amount, M .
Let X =
©
x : S −→ Af
ª
be the set of feasible state-contingent allocations, that also
will be referred to as social choice functions.1 A social choice set is a subset F ⊂ X.
The sets of non-wasteful social choice functions (Xfnw) and social choice sets (F fnw) are
defined in an similar way. Agents’ preferences are represented by state-dependent utility
functions, ui (xi (s) , s). I shall suppose preferences are quasi-linear in money. If φi (s)
represents agent i’s marginal utility of money in state s then the utility function can be
written as
ui
¡
xi (s) , s
¢
= ui
£
oxi (s) ,mxi (s) , s
¤
= ui
£
oxi (s) , s
¤
+ φi (s) ·mxi (s)
with φi (s) > 0 finite for all i and s, where oxi (s) denotes the indivisible object and
mxi (s) the money that agent i consumes in state s according to the social choice function
x. Assume that no indivisible object is infinitely desirable or undesirable as compared to
money. That is ui (oxi (s) , s) is bounded for every i and s. An economy is represented by
a list
E =
³
N,O, S,M,
£
qi (s)
¤
i∈N ,
£
ui (s)
¤
i∈N
´
.
More notation is introduced in the text when needed.
Before continuing with fairness concepts, recall Example 1 and identify the ex ante,
interim and ex post stages. Now states of nature can be defined as utility profiles taking
into account how students value the diﬀerent rooms available in the flat and, in comparison
with them, money. Before moving into the new flat, i.e. ex ante, students are not supposed
to know how they value the rooms, because they have never lived in the flat before nor
1Note that this definition diﬀers from the one generally used in the social choice literature, since now
the social choice function is defined for a given economy, precisely over the set of possible states in that
economy. However our definition is a standard one in the Bayesian implementation literature.
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have any information about their characteristics. They deal with uncertainty of the
same type in a symmetric way. At the interim stage, when they arrive and can have a
first look around they are able to observe the characteristics of the flat, therefore can
tell how they personally value the rooms. Nevertheless, they can not identify the state
of the nature, since private valuations may not be announced truthfully or observable.
Therefore, students in this stage have to cope with uncertainty in an asymmetric way.
Uncertainty disappears at the ex post stage in which, after some time of living together,
students know how their flat-mates think about the flat and value its rooms.
2.1 Fairness concepts
In order to analyze fairness in this model I introduce some useful concepts by the following
definitions. They consider widely used fairness notions from the literature and continue
with the distinction among the three timing stages.
Definition 1 A non-wasteful social choice function x is ex post Pareto optimal if there
is no non-wasteful social choice function y such that
ui
£
yi (s) , s
¤
≥ ui
£
xi (s) , s
¤
for all i in N and all s in S, and with strict inequality for at least one i and one s. Let
Pp denote the set of ex post Pareto optimal social choice functions.
Definition 2 A non-wasteful social choice function x is interim Pareto optimal if there
is no non-wasteful social choice function y such thatX
s∈Ei(s∗)
qi
£
s | Ei (s∗)¤ · ui £yi (s) , s¤ ≥ X
s∈Ei(s∗)
qi
£
s | Ei (s∗)¤ · ui £xi (s) , s¤
for all i in N and s∗ in S, with strict inequality for at least one i and one s∗. Let Pi
denote the set of interim Pareto optimal social choice functions.2
Definition 3 A non-wasteful social choice function x is ex ante Pareto optimal if there
is no non-wasteful social choice function y such thatX
s∈S
qi (s) · ui £yi (s) , s¤ ≥X
s∈S
qi (s) · ui £xi (s) , s¤
for all i in N and with strict inequality for at least one i. Let Pa denote the set of ex ante
Pareto optimal social choice functions.
2qi
£
s | Ei (s∗)¤ is the probability that agent i assigns to state s conditional on the information she
owns after that state s∗ has occured.
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Non-wastefulness has been included in the definitions for Pareto eﬃciency, but it is
not a requirement for envy-freeness.
Definition 4 A social choice function x is ex post envy-free if
ui
£
xi (s) , s
¤
≥ ui
£
xj (s) , s
¤
for all i, j in N and s in S. Let EFp denote the set of ex post envy-free social choice
functions.
Definition 5 A social choice function x is interim envy-free ifX
s∈Ei(s∗)
qi
£
s | Ei (s∗)¤ · ui £xi (s) , s¤ ≥ X
s∈Ei(s∗)
qi
£
s | Ei (s∗)¤ · ui £xj (s) , s¤
for all i, j in N and s∗ in S. Let EFi denote the set of interim envy-free social choice
functions.
Definition 6 A social choice function x is ex ante envy-free ifX
s∈S
qi (s) · ui £xi (s) , s¤ ≥X
s∈S
qi (s) · ui £xj (s) , s¤
for all i and j in N . Let EFa denote the set of ex ante envy-free social choice functions.
The literature oﬀers some general results on the structure of these sets. They are
summarized in the following propositions.
Proposition 1 If a social choice function is ex ante Pareto eﬃcient, then it is also
interim Pareto eﬃcient. If a social choice function is interim Pareto eﬃcient, then it is
also ex post Pareto eﬃcient. That is Pa ⊂ Pi ⊂ Pp.
Proof. See Laﬀont (1981), Mas-Colell, Whinston and Greene (1995) and also check
Holmstrom and Myerson (1983).
Proposition 2 If a social choice function is ex post envy-free, then it is also interim
envy-free. If a social choice function is interim envy-free, then it is also ex ante envy-free.
That is EFa ⊃ EFi ⊃ EFp.
Proof. See Gajdos and Tallon (2001).
The referred papers give proofs for the perfectly divisible case that can be adapted
directly to the present framework. For this reason specific proofs are not included here.
Now fairness can be defined. I use the definition adopted in the literature and call
ex ante intertemporally fair those social choice functions that are both ex ante Pareto
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optimal and also ex post envy-free. The main reason for adopting this definition is that
allocations in the intersection cannot be criticized from any point of view and/or any
timing stage considered in this paper, as this intersection is the most restrictive among
all the possible ones formed by the introduced sets. I emphasize the ex ante point of view
in this definition in order to make contrast to the similar interim fairness concept that is
introduced later.
Definition 7 A social choice function x is ex ante intertemporally fair if x ∈ Pa ∩EFp.
3 Existence
In this section I focus on the existence of ex ante intertemporally fair allocations. As
for the case of economies with uncertainty, but without indivisibilities it is shown in
Gajdos and Tallon (2001) that an ex ante intertemporally fair social choice function
exists whenever agents’ prior beliefs coincide. Alkan, Demange and Gale (1991) study an
economy with indivisible goods in a framework without uncertainty, but in other features
very similar to ours. They study whether there exist allocations that are both eﬃcient
and envy-free. They reach the existence result across two steps: first is shown that non-
wasteful envy-free allocations are also Pareto optimal in this specific environment. Then
the existence of envy-free allocations is proved, that combined with the previous result
establishes non-emptiness for the set of fair allocations. The proof is constructive and can
be used to give an algorithm for finding a fair allocation in the indivisible case. In this
paper I shall follow a similar path. Unfortunately the set of intertemporally fair social
choice functions may be empty. Proposition 3 gives a necessary and suﬃcient condition
under which the set of ex ante intertemporally fair social choice functions in not empty.
The basic idea of the proof is that under that condition ex post envy-free social choice
functions are also Pareto optimal. More discussion of the result is presented after the
proof.
Proposition 3 Consider the economy
E =
n
N,O, S,M,
£
qi (s)
¤
i∈N ,
£
ui (s)
¤
i∈N
o
.
An ex ante intertemporally fair social choice function exists if and only if
for all s, s0 in S there exists γ (s, s0) ∈ R+ such that
qi (s) · φi (s) = γ (s, s0) · qi (s0) · φi (s0) for all i in N. (Condition 1)
Proof. With mathematical terms the proposition says that EFp∩Pa 6= ∅ if and only
if Condition 1 holds. The proof is presented in two parts according to the two directions
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of implication.
1. The if part: I know that the set EFp is not empty (see for example see Alkan, Demange
and Gale (1991)). Therefore it is enough to prove that under Condition 1 any non-wasteful
ex post envy-free eﬃcient social choice function is ex ante Pareto eﬃcient. That is for
non-wasteful social choice functions I have the inclusion EFp ⊂ Pa.
Let x be a non-wasteful ex post envy free social choice function, xi (s) = [oxi (s) ,mxi (s)]
and y (6= x), yi (s) = [oyi (s) ,myi (s)] any non-wasteful social choice function. Let us
suppose that y ex ante Pareto dominates x. This means that for every iX
s∈S
qi (s) · ©ui £oyi (s) , s¤+ φi (s) ·myi (s)ª ≥X
s∈S
qi (s) · ©ui £oxi (s) , s¤+ φi (s) ·mxi (s)ª
(1)
holds and with strict inequality for some i0. Since x is ex post envy-free for all i I have:X
s∈S
qi (s)·©ui £oxi (s) , s¤+ φi (s) ·mxi (s)ª ≥X
s∈S
qi (s)·©ui £oyi (s) , s¤+ φi (s) ·mxρ(i) (s)ª ,
(2)
where ρ (i) is the agent who receives object oyi (s) under x in state s. I let ρ (i) denote that
agent without making reference to state s, since I do not need to specify it for the proof.
The bundle with oyi (s) also consisted of mxρ(i) (s) units of money besides the object.
Finding ρ (i) is like permuting the agents among themselves; and therefore summing for
ρ (i) is like summing up for i in every state, and vice versa. Now let us multiply Equations
1 and 2 by an appropriate positive number, λi ∈ R+ for every i, where λi is defined such
that λi · qi (s1) · φi (s1) = 1 for all i. After that sum up Equations 1 and 2 on both sides
for all agents, and take the right end and the left end of the resulting expression
NX
i=1
X
s∈S
λi · qi (s) · ui £oyi (s) , s¤+ φi (s) ·myi (s) >
>
NX
i=1
X
s∈S
λi · qi (s) · ui £oyi (s) , s¤+ φi (s) ·mxρ(i) (s)
That is,
NP
i=1
P
s∈S
λi · qi (s) · φi (s) ·myi (s) >
NP
i=1
P
s∈S
λi · qi (s) · φi (s) ·mxρ(i) (s).
Note that fixing s1 by Condition 1 for any i and s
0 I have that λi· qi (s0) · φi (s0) = 1
γ(s1,s0)
.
Therefore the last inequality can be rewritten in the following form.
NX
i=1
X
s∈S
myi (s)
γ (s1, s)
>
NX
i=1
X
s∈S
mxi (s)
γ (s1, s)
By non-wastefullness of x I have
NP
i=1
myi (s) =
NP
i=1
mxj (s) = M for all s. Now what is
left over from the previous inequality is M ·Ps∈S 1γ(s1,s) > M ·Ps∈S 1γ(s1,s) that is clearly
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impossible. I have reached a contradiction, hence x is ex ante Pareto optimal.
2. The only if part: Also this part of the proof is by contradiction. I shall show that
any non-wasteful social choice function that is ex post envy-free cannot be ex ante Pareto
eﬃcient if Condition 1 does not hold. As before, take λi such that λi · qi (s1) · φi (s1) = 1
for all i with λi ∈ R+. Let δi (s) = 1
λi·qi(s)·φi(s) . Now take s
∗ such that δi (s∗) 6= δj (s∗)
for some agents i 6= j. Note that such a state s∗ always exists if Condition 1 does not
hold. For simplicity suppose that I have that inequality for agents i1 and i2, and also that
δi1 (s∗) > δi2 (s∗). Take any non-wasteful ex post envy-free social choice function, x, and
consider the following transfers (distortioning x) among agents: if s∗ occurs agent i1 pays
one monetary unit to agent i2; if s1 occurs agent i2 pays
1
δi1(s∗)
monetary units to agent
i2. With this the expected utilities will change in the following manner.
For agent i1:
qi1 (s1) · φi1 (s1) · 1
δi1 (s∗)
+ qi1 (s∗) · φi1 (s∗) · (−1) = 0
For agent i2:
qi2 (s1) · φi2 (s1) ·
µ
− 1
δi1 (s∗)
¶
+ qi2 (s∗) · φi2 (s∗) =
= − λ
i2 · β
δi1 (s∗)
+
λi2 · β
δi2 (s∗)
> 0
Clearly, this means an ex ante Pareto improvement that concludes the proof.
Condition 1 contains as a special case an intuitive restriction on the economy in order
to guarantee the existence of ex ante intertemporally fair social choice functions. It is
stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If agents have the same prior beliefs and preferences show constant marginal
utility of money among agents for a given state, then there exist social choice functions
that are ex ante intertemporally fair, that is, EFp ∩ Pa 6= ∅.
Proof. The result is a direct consequence of Proposition 3, since if agents have the
same prior beliefs and preferences show constant marginal utility of money among agents
for a given state, then Condition 1 is satisfied.
The proof of Proposition 3 is based on the idea that ex post envy-freeness can be
sacrificed in order to reach some ex ante Pareto improvement whenever Condition 1 does
not hold. The following two examples contain numerical illustration for this in a simple
economy with two possible states and one valuable object - plus (N − 1) null-objects.
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Example 3 considers an ex post envy-free social choice function and allow for money
transfers between agents with diﬀerent marginal utility of money. The resulting state-
dependent allocation represents an ex ante Pareto improvement, but it is not ex post
envy-free anymore.
Example 3 Take the case in which M = 10, preferences show diﬀerent marginal util-
ity for money for some agents, there are only two states of nature, s1 and s2, and
only one indivisible good complemented by (N − 1) null objects. Let us suppose that
ui0 [oi0 (s) ,mi (s) , s] =
½
20oi0 +mi if s = s1
10oi0 + 2mi if s = s2
¾
and ui (oi (s) ,mi (s) , s) =
½
20oi + 2mi if s = s1
20oi +mi if s = s2
¾
for all i ∈ N \ {i0}. Consider also that qi (s) =
½
0.4 if s = s1
0.6 if s = s2
¾
for all i ∈ N . The fol-
lowing social choice function is non-wasteful and ex post envy free: in every state give the
object to i0 and also
¡
20
N
− 10
¢
units of money, let each of the other agents receive
¡
20
N
¢
units of money. This social choice function is ex ante Pareto dominated by the following
one: if s = s1, then give the object to i0 and also
¡
20
N
− 11
¢
units of money, let i1 6= i0
get
¡
20
N
+ 1
¢
and each of the other agents receive
¡
20
N
¢
units of money; if s = s2, then give
the object to i0 with
¡
20
N
− 9
¢
units of money, give
¡
20
N
− 1
¢
money to i1 6= i0 and let each
of the other agents receive 20
N
units of money. The latter social choice function is clearly
not ex post envy-free.
Note that in the same way one can ex ante Pareto improve any ex post envy-free
state-contingent allocation whenever there is diﬀerent marginal utility for money for some
agents in the same state and the following condition does not hold:
For all s, s0 φi (s) = γ (s, s0) · φi (s0) for all i with γ (s, s0) ∈ R+. (Condition 2)
Example 4 considers a similar economy to the one in Example 3, but now agents will
not share a common prior distribution and this will allow for ex ante Pareto improvements
in the case of any ex post envy-free social choice function.
Example 4 Take the case in which M = 10, preferences show the same marginal utility
of money for every agent, there are only two states of nature, s1 and s2, and only one
indivisible good complemented by (N − 1) null objects. Let us suppose that ui0 [oi0 (s) , s] =½
20oi0 if s = s1
10oi0 if s = s2
¾
and ui [oi (s) , s] =
½
10oi if s = s1
20oi if s = s2
¾
for all i ∈ N \ {i0}.
Consider also that qi0 (s) =
½
0.2 if s = s1
0.8 if s = s2
¾
and qi (s) =
½
0.8 if s = s1
0.2 if s = s2
¾
for all i ∈
N \ {i0}. The following social choice function is non-wasteful and ex post envy free: if
s = s1, then give the object to i0 and also
¡
20
N
− 10
¢
units of money, let each of the other
agents receive
¡
20
N
¢
units of money; if s = s2, then give the object to i1 6= i0 with
¡
30
N
− 20
¢
12
units of money and let each of the other agents receive
¡
30
N
¢
units of money. This social
choice function is ex ante Pareto dominated by the following one: if s = s1, then give
the object to i0 and also
¡
20
N
− 11
¢
units of money, let i1 6= i0 get
¡
20
N
+ 1
¢
and each of
the other agents receive
¡
20
N
¢
units of money; if s = s2, then give the object to i1 6= i0
with
¡
30
N
− 21
¢
units of money, give
¡
30
N
+ 1
¢
money to i0 and let each of the other agents
receive 30
N
units of money. The latter social choice function is clearly not ex post envy-free.
Corollary 2 Under Condition 2 I have that EFa∩Pa 6= ∅, EFi∩Pi 6= ∅, EFp∩Pp 6= ∅,
EFp ∩ Pa 6= ∅, EFp ∩ Pi 6= ∅.
Proof. The results are direct consequences of previous propositions and the inclusion
results among the sets in question.
I have not put any restriction on the sign of the amount of money contained in the
bundles. The possibility of negative distribution of money might be essential for the
existence of intertemporally fair social choice functions. As discussed in Alkan, Demange
and Gale (1991) and Aragone´s (1995) in the certainty case, if distribution of money is
restricted to be positive, then for the existence result to hold one must be sure that there
is enough money to be distributed in the economy. This finding can be easily presented
for the uncertainty case as well. Supposing that Condition 1 holds, the amount of money
in the economy M , that is not state-dependent, should be large enough to be able to
assure existence in every state of the nature.
Note that until this point I have been following an ex ante approach, because I have
been dealing with a symmetric situation, considering the uncertainty of each agent not
knowing which state of nature from S will occur. This is the reason for putting the
qualification ex ante before intertemporally fair social choice functions. Nevertheless,
fairness for the interim stage can defined in a similar way. It is interesting that if I move
to the interim stage, that is I consider for example that state s1 has occurred then there
are only degenerated cases in which ex post envy-freeness combined with non-wastefulness
implies interim Pareto optimality. For the formal definition of interim eﬃciency and more
details on the statement check Appendix A.3
Condition 1 plays a decisive role in the existence of intertemporally fair social choice
functions, as it is required to ensure ex ante Pareto eﬃciency. I have shown in a formal
proof and also illustrated with two examples that without it one can always find an ex
ante Pareto improvement. If I were to define intertemporal fairness with the help of ex
post Pareto eﬃciency I could do without Condition 1. According to the fairness literature
with certainty an (ex post) envy-free and (ex post) Pareto eﬃcient social choice function
3We state the following proposition (Proposition 10) in the appendix, because the interim considera-
tions do not constitute the main objective of this paper.
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exists. Since this result holds for every state s I have existence with all the possible
definitions of intertemporal fairness that deals with ex post eﬃciency.
3.1 Structure of the fair set
The set of envy free allocations, in a set-up with indivisible goods without uncertainty,
has a nice structure as was shown by Alkan, Demange and Gale (1991). My next results
generalize this finding for the case of uncertainty supposed that Condition 1 holds. In
particular I show that the set of ex post envy-free social choice functions owns the lattice
property. In order to do so some pieces of notation have to be introduced.
Let x and y be two social choice functions and let
ux (s) =
£
u1x (s) , . . . , u
N
x (s)
¤
denote the vector of utility levels that players enjoy according to x in state s. The owner
of object o in state s will be referred to as io. An other vector uy (s) is defined similarly.
Now consider the following sets
Nsx =
©
i ∈ N : uix (s) > uiy (s)
ª
, Osx =
©
o ∈ O : mxio (s) > myio (s)
ª
,
Nsy =
©
i ∈ N : uiy (s) > uix (s)
ª
, Osy =
©
o ∈ O : myio (s) > mxio (s)
ª
,
Ns0 =
©
i ∈ N : uix (s) = uiy (s)
ª
, Os0 =
©
o ∈ O : mxio (s) = myio (s)
ª
.
The social choice function x induces a mapping between N and O for every state s.
It attaches to every agent in N an object from O, precisely the object that the agent
receives according to x in state s. Alkan, Demange and Gale (1991) in a set-up without
uncertainty about the state of nature show that for any state s two ex post envy-free
social choice functions x and y are indeed bijections between Nsx and O
s
x, N
s
y and O
s
y,
Ns0 and O
s
0. A consequence of this result is the lattice property for which the following
operators are defined. Given vectors a and b
a ∨ b = c, where ci = min (ai, bi) ,
a ∧ b = c, where ci = max (ai, bi) .
Let z = x ∧ y be a social choice function defined as follows
a) for every state s in S, ozi (s) =
½
oxi (s) if i ∈ Nsx
oyi (s) if i ∈ Nsy ∪Ns0
¾
;
b) for every state s in S, mzi (s) = mxi (s) ∧myi (s) .
Proposition 4 (Lattice property) If x and y are ex post envy-free social choice func-
tions, then the social choice function x ∧ y is ex post envy-free.
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Proof. I omit the proof as, using the above introduced notation, it is very similar to
the one presented in Alkan, Demange and Gale (1991).
As shown in Alkan, Demange and Gale (1991), similar result holds with the minimum
operator. This result is useful when defining refinements on the set of ex post envy-free
social choice functions that can be very large in general. For a given social choice function
x and state s I write uminx (s) = min
i∈N
ux (s) and u
max
x (s) = max
i∈N
ux (s).
Definition 8 A non-wasteful ex post envy-free social choice function x is called Rawlsian
if uminx (s) ≥ uminy (s) for all non-wasteful ex post envy-free social choice function y and
state s.
The set of Rawlsian ex post envy-free social choice functions is well-defined thanks
to the lattice property. A Rawlsian social choice function gives a Rawlsian allocation in
every possible state of nature. As in the case without uncertainty one can show that the
elements of the set of Rawlsian ex post envy-free social choice functions induce the same
utility level profile. The result is trivial if one considers that in a given state s utility
levels are the same for all Rawlsian allocations in that state.
4 Implementation
Now that non-emptiness of the ex ante intertemporally fair set is assured under Condition
1, I can turn my attention to implementation matters. I shall suppose that Condition
1 holds and will concentrate on the implementation of the set of non-wasteful ex post
envy-free social choice functions. First implementation at the interim stage is considered,
i.e. after the occurrence of a given state when information is asymmetric. In the interim
set-up Bayesian implementation is the adequate tool. ex ante implementation is studied
later in a separate subsection. Now I introduce some extra notation that will be used in
this section.
A mechanism for an economy is a pair (Σ, g), where Σ = Σ1 × . . .× ΣN , g : Σ→ Af .
A strategy for agent i is σi : Πi → Σi. A deception for agent i is a mapping αi : Πi → Πi,
α =
¡
α1, ..., αN
¢
.
The following definition of implementation comes from Jackson (1991).
Definition 9 A mechanism (Σ, g) implements in Bayes-Nash equilibrium a social choice
set, F if:
a) for any x ∈ F there exists a Bayes-Nash equilibrium σ with g {σ [Ei (s)]} = x (s) for
all s, and
b) for any Bayes-Nash equilibrium σ there exists x ∈ F with g {σ [Ei (s)]} = x (s) for all
s.
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As shown in Jackson (1991) Bayesian incentive compatibility is needed for Bayesian
implementability.
Definition 10 A social choice set F satisfies Bayesian Incentive Compatibility is for all
x ∈ F , i, s and Ei ∈ Πi,X
s∈Ei(s)
qi
£
s | Ei (s)¤ · ui £xi (s) , s¤ ≥ X
s∈Ei(s)
qi
£
s | Ei (s)¤ · ui £xiEi (s) , s¤
with
xEi (s) =



x
½·
∩
j 6=i
Ej (s)
¸
∩Ei
¾
if the argument is not empty
0 otherwise


 .
Unfortunately Bayesian Incentive Compatibility is not guaranteed in general in the
model. Some restrictions on the structure of information owned by agents have to be
introduced. Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) consider Bayesian implementation in a set-up
in which information is non-exclusive. They prove that if there are at least three agents,
information is non-exclusive and the social choice set F 6= ∅ to be implemented satisfies
Bayesian monotonicity, then F is indeed implementable. It is not diﬃcult to show that
the set of non-wasteful ex post envy-free social choice functions satisfy the requirement of
Bayesian monotonicity. In order to assure implementability from now on let us suppose
that information is non-exclusive, that is
Ei (s) ⊃ ∩
j 6=i
Ej (s) for all i in N and s in S. (NEI)
Note that the former assumption of no redundant states combine with NEI delivers
the fact that (N − 1) agents can identify without uncertainty the state that has occurred,
i.e. ∩
j 6=i
Ej (s) = {s} for all i and s. Now let me introduce the following notation that will
be useful in defining a mechanism:
D (σ) =
½
s∗ ∈ S : ∩
i∈Nr{j}
σi = {s∗} for some j ∈ N
¾
.
The punishment that dissuades agents from deviation in some cases is F ∈ R. It can
be interpreted as a fine that players must pay when they fail to reach some agreement to
be specified later with the mechanism. As for the example of flat-mates it could be seen
as monetary equivalent of all the inconveniences that the lack of agreement can cause,
for example the cost of looking for a new flat or flat-mates, or the utility loss due to the
persistence of envy. F can be found with the help of the following inequality:
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ui
£
xi (s) , s
¤
> ui
µ
o,
M
N
, s
¶
− F for all i, s, o and non-wasteful
ex post envy free social choice function x.
F is well-defined since no object is infinitely desirable, and the set of states and the one
of objects are both finite. Let us define the mechanism as follows.
Definition 11 (M) Every agent has to announce (simultaneously) some elements from
the partition Πi denoted by ei. Players also have to choose a permutation pi over the set
N and a non-negative integer. The message space for agent i is then Σi = Πi×P i×Z0+
with a typical element in the form of (ei, zi). The outcome of the mechanism, g, is defined
as follows.
a) If #D = 1 and there are at least (N − 1) zeros among the zi, then the outcome is¡
p1 ◦ . . . ◦ pN
¢
[x (s0)] where {s0} = D and x is some non-wasteful ex post envy-free social
choice function. In this case, after the first stage the planner oﬀers a non-wasteful ex post
envy-free allocation for s0, i.e. x (s0) ∈ EFp ∩ F fnw.
b) If #D > 1 and there are at least (N − 1) zeros among the zi, then let assign objects to
agents in a random way (for example in such a way that agent i can get any of the objects
with the same probability) and allocate money equally, giving M
N
to everyone. Agents in
this case are forced to pay a fine of the amount F each.
c) In any other case let the agent with the smallest index among those who have announced
the largest zi receive the object of her choice and max {0,M} amount of money. The other
players receive a random object from the ones that have been left over and the following
amount of money min
©
0, M
N−1
ª
.
In what follows I show that this mechanism can be used to implement the set of ex-
post envy-free social choice functions. It is point a) in the above definition according
to which the Bayes-Nash equilibrium outcomes of the game are determined. Points b)
and c) introduce incentives for reporting the state of nature truthfully be optimal for
agents. Under b) agents are severely punished by a fine that amounts F . In point c) the
mechanism contains an integer game that gives incentives to participants to send messages
that give rise to situations that fall under point a). Proposition 5 states the formal result
and is followed by the formal proof.
Proposition 5 Let x be a non-wasteful ex post envy-free social choice function. If N ≥ 3
and information is non-exclusive the mechanismM implements x in Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium.
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Proof. Suppose that the conditions of the proposition hold. Let us prove first that for
any state of the world every equilibrium outcome ofM is a non-wasteful ex post envy-free
allocation.
1.1. Note that there can not exist any equilibrium under c) or b). The first one is the
case of an integer game in which, given the others’ choice, every player i has incentives
to announce a larger integer above the level of
max
©
z1, . . . , zi−1, zi+1, . . . , zN
ª
.
1.2. Under b) agents are severely punished and have incentives to change their announce-
ments. If there are at least (N − 2) zeros among the announced zi by setting ei = ∅
and zi = 0, and inducing case a). Or, if there are less then (N − 1) zeros among the
announced zi by the others any agent can switch to case c) by announcing a suﬃciently
large integer.
1.3. Therefore only case a) can support an equilibrium. Its allocation must be ex post
envy-free due to the enclosed permutation game.
In the second part I shall show that any non-wasteful envy-free social choice function can
be supported as an equilibrium of the mechanismM.
2. In order to do so let us show that σi∗ =
£
Ei (s) , pid, 0
¤
for all i constitutes an equi-
librium of the mechanism M where pid stands for the identity permutation. Note that
no agent has incentives to switch to case b), since in that one all agents are seriously
punished by a fine that makes them worse oﬀ than in any possible result under a). Case
c) might be a tempting possibility but for a single player it is impossible to switch directly
from a) to c) when the others are playing according to σ∗.
In first place the mechanismM is designed to extract true information from agents.
Joining that, the planner is able to find out which state of nature has occurred and her
task is to find a particular non-wasteful ex post envy-free social choice function. There
exist numerous algorithms that can be used to find envy-free allocations for every state,
hence for constructing the ex post envy-free social choice function. For examples check
Alkan, Demange and Gale (1991), Aragone´s (1995) and Su(1999).
Note that the mechanism is not wasteful in equilibrium and the indivisible objects are
always allocated according to the rules of the economy, however it contains threats under
case b) that are not budget balanced. These are needed, because even if (N − 1) players
are able to identify the occurred state, the planner can not always identify the deviator
and therefore has to punish everyone to avoid deviations.
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4.1 Implementation ex ante
Let us study more carefully the ex ante situation when information is symmetric, i.e.
agents have prior beliefs about the occurrence of the states and these beliefs are known
to everyone. I do not have to deal with social choice functions or set anymore, but with
allocations.4 Since agents do not know which state will occur, they value these bundles
according to their expected utility function. For simplicity I shall define a utility function
for this case: vi (ai) =
P
s∈S
qi (s) · ui (ai, s). Note that previous results hold, meaning that
an envy-free allocation is also Pareto optimal in this economy. For vi it is useless to
distinguish between ex ante, interim or ex post concepts, but it is worth to point out
that for example its envy-freeness is closely related to the ex ante envy-freeness notion
that I had before. The most important change is that before I had social choice functions
and now I am working with allocations that do not change with the states of nature -
they are no longer state-contingent. For this reason I only consider constant social choice
functions in this subsection that simply will be called allocations. Now with redefining
my envy-freeness and Pareto-optimality concepts with allocations I have the following
result.5
Proposition 6 If Condition 1 holds any non-wasteful ex ante envy-free feasible allocation
is ex ante Pareto optimal.
Proof. Just like in Proposition 3.
Now let us turn my attention to implementation matters. Taking into account the
previous notes and assuming that Condition 1 holds I have that the well-known ”divide
and permute”6 mechanism implements (in Nash equilibrium) the set of ex ante envy free
allocations that are also ex ante Pareto optimal according to the last proposition.
Definition 12 The ”divide and permute” mechanism. The message space for agent i is
Σi =
½
Afnw × p if i = 1, 2
p otherwise
¾
where p denotes the set of all possible permutations in N .
The outcome function is g with the following definition7:
g (σ) =
(
(pn ◦ . . . ◦ p1) (a1) if af1 = af2¡
orand, M
N
− F
¢N
otherwise
)
.
4Nevertheless there might exist problems in which the ex-ante implementation of a social choice
function is interesting. A ”divide and permute” type mechanism can be used in those cases, too. The
only modification required is that the first two players have to announce a non-wasteful social choice
function instead of an allocation.
5Note that in this context only notions corresponding to the earlier ex-ante concepts have meanings.
6For details check Thomson (1995).
7The symbol orand stands for a random object from O.
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The proof of this implementation result is not included here, since my ex ante imple-
mentation problem is technically identical to the Nash implementation of envy-free alloca-
tions problem studied in the literature, for instance in Thomson (1995). The ”divide and
permute” or cake-cutting mechanisms that was designed for the two-player divisible case,
have many variants and generalizations for situations with more participants and indi-
visibilities.8 Unfortunately they do not perform well under uncertainties. McAfee (1992)
points out that the cake-cutting mechanism produces eﬃcient results under symmetric
information, but under asymmetric information it is ex post ineﬃcient in an unusual way.
5 Existence with generalized fairness concept
The literature on distributive justice usually does not deal with the problematic of choos-
ing fairness criteria. Concepts are very often axiomatically justified, and/or their use is
made acceptable intuitively. In this section I enlarge my focus and study some generalized
fairness concepts. This allows for more judgements on fairness and does not exclusively
deal with envy-freeness.
In order to do so, following the idea in Corcho´n and Iturbe-Ormaetxe (2001) I define
for every agent i a function ψi : Af × S −→ Ai which I call state-dependent aspiration
function, or simply aspiration function. Let ψ =
¡
ψ1, . . . , ψN
¢
. The expression ψi [x (s) , s]
denotes the personal aspiration of agent i in state s when the social choice function is
x.9 It can be interpreted as the list of bundles for agent i that she thinks are fair in
each state, when bundles are assigned according to the social choice function x in the
population. Note that the personal aspirations may perfectly be unfeasible together. The
next definition identifies the feasible aspiration correspondences.
Definition 13 Given the social choice function x, the aspiration function ψ is feasible if
ψi [x (s) , s] ∈ Af for all i and s.
I can generalize the fairness concepts with the help of the aspiration function also
in the uncertainty case. Envy-free social choice functions, for example, will be a special
case of the satisfactory ones defined below. For this to be true, one should think about
personal aspirations, for a given state and social choice function, as the best bundle owned
by any agent in the given state and according to the given social choice function.10
8For examples check Brams and Taylor (1996).
9The notation ψi (x (s) , s) is redundant, since x (s) ∈ Af gives the allocation for the whole set of
agents in state s. Therefore it is clear that we are dealing with aspirations for state s and we could
simply write ψi (x (s)). However the notation in longer form is more in line with the formal definition
and for this reason is kept.
10For more explanation, intuition and results under certainty check Corcho´n, Iturbe-Ormaetxe (2001).
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Definition 14 A feasible social choice function x, given ψ, is ex post satisfactory if
ui
£
xi (s) , s
¤
≥ ui
©
ψi [x (s) , s] , s
ª
for all i and s.
Definition 15 A feasible social choice function x, given ψ, is ex ante satisfactory ifX
s∈S
qi (s) · ui £xi (s) , s¤ ≥X
s∈S
qi (s) · ui ©ψi [x (s) , s] , sª for all i.
The widely used egalitarian solution can be captured also as a special case with the
following definitions of adequate social choice functions.
Definition 16 A feasible social choice function x, given ψ, is ex post adequate if
ui
£
xi (s) , s
¤
= ui
©
ψi [x (s) , s] , s
ª
for all i and s.
Definition 17 A feasible social choice function x, given ψ, is ex ante adequate ifX
s∈S
qi (s) · ui £xi (s) , s¤ =X
s∈S
qi (s) · ui ©ψi [x (s) , s] , sª for all i.
The above definitions are natural generalizations of the ones in Corcho´n and Iturbe-
Ormaetxe (2001). The generalized version of Proposition 2, describing the relation be-
tween ex post and ex ante terms, holds using either the satisfactory or the adequate
fairness concepts.
Proposition 7 If a social choice function is ex post satisfactory (adequate), then it is
also ex ante satisfactory (adequate).
Proof. If one weights the inequalities (equalities) in the definition for ex post satis-
factory (adequate) social choice functions by the prior probabilities and sum the results
up for every possible state, one gets the requirement stated in the definition for ex ante
satisfactory (adequate) social choice function.
Naturally I could define the corresponding interim concepts as well, and state the
inclusion result in a similar proposition. Since I am not particularly interested in the
interim stage in this section these parts are omitted.
Intertemporal fairness now can be captured by ex post satisfactory (or adequate) social
choice functions that are ex ante Pareto eﬃcient. This point of view allows for the same
arguments as presented before for the envy-free case. Unfortunately with the general form
of aspirations I cannot prove existence of the satisfactory nor the adequate social choice
functions, neither ex post or ex ante. Therefore let us introduce the concept of unbiased
social choice functions that do exist under some mild assumptions on preferences and the
feasible consumption set in the certain case, as shown in Corcho´n and Iturbe-Ormaetxe
(2001).
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Definition 18 A feasible social choice function x, given ψ, is ex post unbiased if for any
state s any of the following statements holds:
a) ui [xi (s) , s] ≥ ui
©
ψi [x (s) , s] , s
ª
for all i, or
b) ui [xi (s) , s] < ui
©
ψi [x (s) , s] , s
ª
for all i.
Note that I can not define ex post biasedness in such a way that requires inequality
a) or inequality b) to hold for all possible s. Vaguely speaking this is because aspirations
are now state-dependent. There might be states in which aspirations are too high to
inequality a) to hold, while in some other might be so low that b) is impossible. The next
example, even if it is an extreme case, illustrates this statement.
Example 5 Suppose that in state s1, independently from the social choice function, every
agent is satisfied with the indivisible object she has been assigned to, but aspires to some
extra amount of money, ε > 0. This falls clearly under case b) in Definition 18, as personal
aspirations can not be reached. If s1 was the only possible state of nature, I would have
unbiasedness. Let us suppose that in some other state s2 aspirations are humble in the
sense that every agent is satisfied with her indivisible object and does not aspires to any
amount of money. This and M > 0 give case a) in Definition 18.
With my definition an ex post unbiased and ex ante Pareto eﬃcient social choice
functions exists if and only if Condition 1 holds. This is a direct consequence of the
results for the certain case in Corcho´n and Iturbe-Ormaetxe (2001) and the one that I
discussed before according to which Condition 1 is needed for ex ante Pareto eﬃciency.
Definition 19 A feasible social choice function x, given ψ, is ex ante unbiased if for any
state s any of the following statements holds:
a)
P
s∈S
qi (s) · ui [xi (s) , s] ≥ P
s∈S
qi (s) · ui ©ψi [x (s) , s] , sª for all i, or
b)
P
s∈S
qi (s) · ui [xi (s) , s] < P
s∈S
qi (s) · ui ©ψi [x (s) , s] , sª for all i.
There is no relation between the above ex post and ex ante unbiasedness concepts of
the inclusion type, like I had before for the envy-free case. Therefore the question whether
an ex ante unbiased and ex ante eﬃcient social choice function exists is not trivial. The
following propositions states that in fact, under Condition 1, there exist social choice
functions that are ex ante unbiased and ex ante Pareto eﬃcient.
Proposition 8 Given the aspiration function ψ, there exists an ex ante unbiased and ex
ante Pareto social choice function if and only if Condition 1 holds.
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Proof. This proof for the uncertainty case I present here goes parallel with the proof
for certainty from Corcho´n and Iturbe-Ormaetxe (2001), and it is tailored to the specific
set-up I study. For the sake of this proof let us introduce a technical change in the
definition of the consumption set and extend the set of possible money consumption in
the bundles to the set of extended real numbers: A = (O ×R∗)N where R∗ denotes the
set of extended real numbers that is compact, non-empty and convex. Let Sn−1 be the
(n− 1) dimensional simplex. In my set-up a social choice function is ex ante Pareto
eﬃcient if for a given λ ∈ Sn−1 it solves the following maximization problem:
max
x∈X
X
i∈N
λi ·
X
s∈S
qi (s) · ui £xi (s) , s¤ .
I can split the above problem into two part: finding the way of distributing the indivisible
objects among agents and then the distribution of the perfectly divisible one.
max
x∈X
X
i∈N
λi ·
X
s∈S
qi (s) · ui £oxi (s) , s¤+X
i∈N
λi ·
X
s∈S
qi (s) · φi (s) ·mxi (s) ,
max
ox
X
i∈N
λi ·
X
s∈S
qi (s) · ui £oxi (s) , s¤+max
mx
X
i∈N
λi ·
X
s∈S
qi (s) · φi (s) ·mxi (s) .
Since the sets S, N , O are finite the first maximization problem has a solution with some
finite value. The second one has a solution too, because mxi (s) ∈ R∗ for all i and s, and
qi (s) · φi (s) ·mxi (s) is continuous, strictly increasing in mxi (s). Let the solution of the
second maximization problem be ρ : Sn−1 → (R∗)N ·S. It is convex-valued (R∗ is convex
and utilities are quasilinear in money) and upper hemicontinuous (by Berge’s Maximum
Theorem). Now let us define
Di [x (s) , s] = Di
©
xi (s) , ψi [x (s) , s] , s
ª
= ui
©
ψi [x (s) , s] , s
ª
− ui
£
xi (s) , s
¤
that can be separated into two parts: utility diﬀerence from the indivisible goods and the
diﬀerence from money. Note that Di [x (s) , s] is continuous in money. Consider now the
following maximization problem for a fixed social choice function x:
max
λ∈Sn−1
X
i∈N
λi ·
X
s∈S
qi (s) ·Di ©xi (s) , ψi [x (s) , s] , sª .
I define ϕ : (R∗)N ·S → Sn−1 as the solution function for the money allocation part of
the above maximization problem. This correspondence is also convex-valued and upper
hemicontinuous. Therefore the mapping ϕ ◦ ρ : Sn−1 → Sn−1 has a fixed point λ∗ with
m∗ ∈ λ∗. And there is some x∗ that belongs to that m∗. Now let us show that I must
have ex ante unbiasedness by contradiction. Suppose that there are i and j such thatX
s∈S
qi (s) ·Di [x∗ (s) , s] ≥ 0,X
s∈S
qj (s) ·Dj [x∗ (s) , s] < 0.
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Then I must have λ∗j = 0, and in the ex ante Pareto program (according to x∗) agent j
will be assigned the amount of −∞ of money (the worst possible amount) in every state.
But that, with my assumptions would be in contradiction with
P
s∈S
qj (s)·Dj [x∗ (s) , s] < 0.
This completes the proof.
Condition 1 turns out to be crucial for existence results, because I have required Pareto
eﬃciency for every fairness concept. Condition 1, in fact, arises due to this fact, and it
is possible to show that any non-wasteful social choice function that induces an ex post
optimal assignment of indivisible objects is ex ante Pareto eﬃcient if and only if Condition
1 holds. For the formal proof check Appendix B.
When considering implementation of some social choice set an important topic of
monotonicity arises. In the certainty case Maskin monotonicity can be guaranteed by some
rationality requirements on aspirations.11 my goal now is to study Bayesian monotonicity,
because that is the property needed for Bayesian implementability. In order to do so more
concepts and some pieces of notation that generalize those from Corcho´n and Iturbe-
Ormaetxe (2001) for the uncertainty case have to be introduced .
Definition 20 The social choice set F is attainable in an ex ante satisfactory way if
there is ψ such that the social choice function x belongs to F if and only if x is an ex ante
satisfactory social choice function for ψ.
Let Zi : X −→ X i be a correspondence. The set Zi (x) is interpreted as the set of
state-contingent allocations that agent i thinks she is entitled to, given the social choice
function x.
Definition 21 The aspiration function ψ is called ex ante rational if, for all i,
ψi = argmax
X
s∈S
qi (s) · ui £xi (s) , s¤
with xi ∈ Zi (x).
The above maximization problem need not to have a single solution, but ties can be
handled by some arbitrary rule. ex ante rationality now requires utility maximization ex
ante. For a given social choice function, every agent should choose her personal aspiration
in such a way that maximizes her expected utility over the set Zi (x).
I consider compatible deceptions and Bayesian monotonicity in the form as they appear
in Palfrey and Srivastava (1987). I take the definitions from there and present them in
order to have a self-contained study of the problem.
11For more details see Corcho´n and Iturbe-Ormaetxe (2001).
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Definition 22 A collection of functions α =
¡
α1, ..., αN
¢
, with αi : Πi → Πi, is a decep-
tion compatible with {Πi} if for all ¡E1, ..., EN¢ such that Ei ∈ Πi for all i, ∩
i∈N
Ei 6= ∅
implies ∩
i∈N
α (Ei) 6= ∅.
Let us introduce the following short-hand notation:
α (s) = ∩
i∈N
αi
£
Ei (s)
¤
, xα (s) = x [α (s)] , xα = [xα (s1) , xα (s2) , ...] .
It will simplify the following definition of Bayesian monotonicity.
Definition 23 The social choice set F satisfies Bayesian monotonicity if for all α com-
patible with {Πi} if
a) x ∈ F ,
b) for all agent i, state s∗ and social choice function y,X
s∈Ei(α(s∗))
qi
©
s | Ei [α (s∗)]ª · ui £xi (s) , s¤ ≥ X
s∈Ei(α(s∗))
qi
©
s | Ei [α (s∗)]ª · ui £yi (s) , s¤
⇓X
s∈Ei(s∗)
qi
£
s | Ei (s∗)¤ · ui £xiα (s) , s¤ ≥ X
s∈Ei(s∗)
qi
£
s | Ei (s∗)¤ · ui £yiα (s) , s¤
then xα ∈ F .
Now I can state the following positive result on Bayesian monotonicity in my set-up.
It implies that imposing an extra condition on the social choice function and aspirations,
the set of intertemporally fair social choice functions can be implemented at the interim
stage, i.e. by Bayesian implementations.
Proposition 9 Let F be a social choice set that is attainable in an ex ante satisfactory
way with ex ante rational aspirations. F is Bayesian monotonic if
yi ∈ Zi (x) =⇒ yiα ∈ Zi (xα) for all i. (Condition 3)
Proof. Let x ∈ F , where F is attainable in an ex ante satisfactory way with rational
aspirations. Then for all i and s∗ I have thatX
s∈Ei(α(s∗))
qi
©
s | Ei [α (s∗)]ª · ui £xi (s) , s¤ ≥ X
s∈Ei(α(s∗))
qi
©
s | Ei [α (s∗)]ª · ui £yi (s) , s¤
for all yi ∈ Zi (x) .
By the implication in the definition of Bayesian monotonicity I also have that the above
implies X
s∈Ei(s∗)
qi
£
s | Ei (s∗)¤ · ui £xiα (s) , s¤ ≥ X
s∈Ei(s∗)
qi
£
s | Ei (s∗)¤ · ui £yiα (s) , s¤
for all yi ∈ Zi (x) .
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If Condition 3 holds the latter shows that xα is satisfactory, because then I have the
inequality for all yα ∈ Zi (xα). Hence xα ∈ F and therefore F is Bayesian monotonic.
As a special case, the ex post envy-free social choice set satisfies Condition 3. To see
this in an intuitive way consider the following. With the concept of envy-freeness, and
some social choice function x, the set Zi (x) contains those state-contingent allocations
that in a given state s∗ have the other agents’ consumption bundles, from the same
state s∗, as components. For x to be ex post envy-free every agent i has to choose the
best one among these, and that for every state in M . Now let us introduce compatible
deceptions, α. With this Zi (xα) will contain those state-contingent allocations that in
state α (s∗) have the others’ consumption bundles, from state α (s∗). Note that α (s∗)
contains elements from S. Therefore the implication in Condition 3 is straightforward.
6 Concluding remarks
I have considered the problem of allocating indivisible goods and money among members
of an economy in which agents are not perfectly informed on the others’ preferences. The
set of intertemporally fair social choice functions have been studied that are defined as
ex-post envy-free and ex-ante Pareto eﬃcient, as this intersection is the most restrictive
among all the possible ones. The appealing features of envy-free allocations explored
in the literature on economies without uncertainties extend to the economy with uncer-
tainty. These are the lattice structure of the intertemporally fair set, the consistency and
monotonicity results (not studied here in detail) and the fact that envy-freeness implies
Pareto eﬃciency. It is the latter in the ex-ante stage that might make the intertempo-
rally fair set be empty. I have derived a necessary and suﬃcient condition for existence
(non-emptiness) that in economies, in which the marginal utility of money is the same for
every agent, requires prior beliefs to be the same for everyone.
Under this conditions and the one of nonexclusiveness of information the implemen-
tation of the intertemporally fair set has been studied both in the interim and ex-ante
stage. Concrete mechanisms have been proposed to achieve full implementation.
I have also proposed a generalized version of intertemporal fairness based on the aspira-
tion function and Pareto eﬃciency. Due to the presence of Pareto eﬃciency the condition
on beliefs derived in the first part of the paper for existence remains necessary and suf-
ficient. In the concluding result a condition for Bayesian monotonicity has been derived,
i.e. for Bayesian implementation of the generalized intertemporally fair set.
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7 Appendix A
Definition 24 Suppose that agents have reached the interim stage and some state of
nature, s1, has occurred. A social choice function x is interim intertemporally fair if
x ∈ Pi ∩EFp.
I keep the notation for simplicity, but point out that the definition of Pi slightly diﬀers
now, because I only consider the state that in fact has occurred, i.e. when for instance s1
has occurred. From an interim point of view I shall use the following definition.
Definition 25 From an interim point of view a non-wasteful social choice function x is
interim Pareto optimal if there is no non-wasteful social choice function y such thatX
s∈Ei(s1)
qi
£
s | Ei (s1)
¤ · ui £yi (s) , s¤ ≥ X
s∈Ei(s1)
qi
£
s | Ei (s1)
¤ · ui £xi (s) , s¤
for all i in N , with strict inequality for at least one i. Let Pi denote the set of interim
Pareto optimal social choice functions.
Proposition 10 Suppose that agents have reached the interim stage, i.e. a given state
has occurred. EFp ∩ Pi 6= ∅ if and only if agents have no uncertainty about the state of
nature at the interim stage.
Proof. The if part has been already shown before, since if there is no uncertainty I
am dealing with the intersection of EFp ∩Pp that is known to be not empty in my set-up
with indivisibilities.
For the only if part suppose that s1 has occurred. Then the result can be proven similarly
as Proposition 3. From that proof the condition for non-emptiness that arises is
qi (s | s1) · φi (s) = γ (s0) · qi (s0 | s1) · φi (s0)
for all s, s0 ∈ Ei (s1) and i with γ ∈ R+. This implies that Ei (s1) = E (s1) for all i that
is only compatible with the assumption of no redundant states if Ei (s1) = E (s1) = {s1}
for all i. And of course this should hold for any particular s1.
8 Appendix B
Definition 26 The assignment of the indivisible objects under the non-wasteful social
choice function x is ex post optimal whenever
P
i∈N
ui [oxi (s) , s] ≥
P
i∈N
ui [oyi (s) , s] for every
s, and any non-wasteful social choice function y.
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Proposition 11 Any non-wasteful social choice function that induces an ex post optimal
assignment of indivisible objects is ex ante Pareto eﬃcient if and only if Condition 1
holds.
Proof. The if part: Note that the optimal assignment of the indivisible objects is a
necessary condition for any kind of Pareto eﬃciency. Taking into account the previous
proposition it is enough to prove that under Condition 1 ex post unbiasedness implies ex
ante Pareto eﬃciency. Consider the social choice function x that is supposed to be non-
wasteful and ex post unbiased, and the following maximization problem whose solutions
give the ex ante eﬃcient money transfers.
max
y∈Xfnw
X
i∈N
τ i ·
X
s∈S
qi (s) · φi (s) ·myi (s)
with τ i ∈ (0, 1) for all i, and
iX
i∈N
τ i = 1 (3)
If I can find some weights τ i such that x solves the above problem then I am done. Now
let consider a non-wasteful social choice function y and the positive numbers, λi ∈ R+ for
every i, where λi is defined such that λi · qi (s1) · φi (s1) = β for all i with β ∈ R+. Note
that fixing s1 by Condition 1 for any i and s
0 I have that λi· qi (s0) · φi (s0) = β
γ(s1,s0)
1P
i∈N
λi
· λi ·
X
s∈S
qi (s) · φi (s) ·myi (s) =
=
1P
i∈N
λi
· β ·
µ
myi (s1) +
myi (s2)
γ (s1, s2)
+ . . .
¶
Now let us sum up the above equality for all players.X
i∈N
1P
i∈N
λi
· λi ·
X
s∈S
qi (s) · φi (s) ·myi (s) =
=
1P
i∈N
λi
· β ·
X
i∈N
µ
myi (s1) +
myi (s2)
γ (s1, s2)
+ . . .
¶
=
=
1P
i∈N
λi
· β ·M ·
X
i∈N
µ
1 +
1
γ (s1, s2)
+ . . .
¶
= const.
The above expression does not depend on the chosen social choice function y, therefore I
can take
τ i =
λiP
i∈N
λi
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that will guarantee that the social choice function x solves the maximization problem in
(7).
The only if part: The proof is like in Proposition 3. By contradiction one could
consider an ex ante Pareto eﬃcient social choice function with optimal assignment and
suppose that Condition 1 does not hold. Using the same argument now I can conclude
that in this case the social choice function in question can not be ex ante Pareto eﬃcient.
It is possible to improve somebody’s expected utility without harming anyone else in the
way I did for the proof of Proposition 3.
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